Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries

, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 115–124 | Cite as

On open access and optimal landings tax

Original Paper


This paper develops two types of simple models on the dynamic interaction between the stock of fish and the effort expended by fishers: continuous-time/discrete-time models in which a landings tax is incorporated as a control variable available to the management authority. The continuous-time model can describe several ideal options of the optimal tax program; however, unfortunately, it is incapable of choosing the best option. Hence, using the alternative tractable discrete-time model and a computational method, the remaining task of determining a unique optimal tax program is accomplished. The fishery thus managed exhibits a regulated open access.


Dynamic reaction Landings tax Open access 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKwansei Gakuin UniversityNishinomiyaJapan

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