Abstract
This paper develops two types of simple models on the dynamic interaction between the stock of fish and the effort expended by fishers: continuous-time/discrete-time models in which a landings tax is incorporated as a control variable available to the management authority. The continuous-time model can describe several ideal options of the optimal tax program; however, unfortunately, it is incapable of choosing the best option. Hence, using the alternative tractable discrete-time model and a computational method, the remaining task of determining a unique optimal tax program is accomplished. The fishery thus managed exhibits a regulated open access.
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Marutani, T. On open access and optimal landings tax. Rev Fish Biol Fisheries 16, 115–124 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11160-006-9007-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11160-006-9007-9