Res Publica

, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp 253–257 | Cite as

Law, Convention and Objectivity: Comments on Kramer

  • Sandra E. Marshall


Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions. I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.


Convention Mind-dependence Objectivity Directives Human practices Kramer 


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  2. Kramer, Matthew. 2008. Is Law’s conventionality consistent with Law’s objectivity? Res Publica 14. doi: 10.1007/s11158-008-9069-8.
  3. Lewis, David. 1986. Convention. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  4. MacCormick, Neil. 1990. The normativity of law. In Issues in contemporary legal philosophy, ed. Ruth Gavison. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Shiner, Roger. 1992. Norm and nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of StirlingStirlingUK

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