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Law, Convention and Objectivity: Comments on Kramer

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Abstract

Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions. I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.

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Notes

  1. Perhaps this is what Kramer means when he says that ‘a house would persist for a certain time as the material object that it is’ Kramer (2008, p. 5), my emphasis.

References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK

    Sandra E. Marshall

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  1. Sandra E. Marshall
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Correspondence to Sandra E. Marshall.

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Marshall, S.E. Law, Convention and Objectivity: Comments on Kramer. Res Publica 14, 253–257 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-008-9070-2

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