Res Publica

, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 33–51 | Cite as

Raising Revenue for Persons with Disabilities

  • Joel Dittmer


Whereas right-libertarians do not think that it is a requirement of justice that we raise revenues for persons with disabilities, both left-libertarians and liberal egalitarians think that there is such a requirement. An issue remains for the latter two theorists—how ought we to raise this revenue? Liberal egalitarians typically endorse either universal taxation or taxation of the wealthy. Left-libertarians, on the other hand, cannot so easily appeal to the methods of universal taxation and taxation of the wealthy, as they are illegitimately coercive. One such method left open to the left-libertarian is one proposed by Michael Otsuka. He argues that both left-libertarians and liberal egalitarians should find the method of taxation of the unjust to be a reasonably strong way of raising revenue. In this paper, I point out problems with Otsuka’s argument, as well as directly criticize the method of taxation of the unjust.


Alternative methods to universal taxation Charity Left-libertarianism Liberal egalitarianism Michael Otsuka Persons with disabilities Right-libertarianism Taxation of the unjust Taxation of the wealthy Universal taxation 



I would like to thank Peter Vallentyne for first introducing me to the topic of this paper. I would like to thank Brian Kierland for his many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Kathryn Robinson for her organizational and stylistic comments on a later version. And I would also like to thank Alan Tomhave for helping me to figure out what I was trying to say with the earliest version of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MissouriColumbiaUSA

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