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Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 55–84 | Cite as

Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

  • Michael Hellwig
  • Kai Hüschelrath
  • Ulrich Laitenberger
Article
  • 274 Downloads

Abstract

The introduction of the European Union (EU) Settlement Procedure in 2008 aimed at promoting the speed and efficiency of cartel investigations by the European Commission (EC). We use a data set that consists of 575 firm groups that were convicted by the EC for cartelization from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on the probability to file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of a firm’s decision to appeal in the pre-settlement era, we subsequently run out-of-sample predictions to estimate the number of hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement procedure. Comparing these estimates with the actual number of appeals, we find a settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of about 53%.

Keywords

Antitrust policy Cartels Settlements Appeals Ex-post evaluation European Union 

JEL Classification

K21 L41 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer, Robert Jackson, Daniel Rubinfeld, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Mengjie Wang and especially the editor Lawrence J. White for very valuable comments and suggestions. Cung Truong Hoang provided excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Hellwig
    • 1
  • Kai Hüschelrath
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ulrich Laitenberger
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.ZEW Centre for European Economic Research and MaCCI Mannheim Centre for Competition and InnovationMannheimGermany
  2. 2.University of Mannheim, L7, 3-5MannheimGermany

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