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Cartel Stability: Determinants and International Evidence

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Abstract

This special issue examines empirically the determinants of cartel formation, stability, and duration with the use of international evidence. Levenstein and Suslow examine the US experience; Zhou considers the problem of recidivism in cartel formation in Europe; Ghosal and Sokol examine both US and European experience with a focus on US policy changes; and Feinberg et al. analyze a recent entrant into strong antitrust enforcement: South Korea.

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Notes

  1. Marvao (2016), however, does examine how recidivism in cartel activity paradoxically tends to increase the extent of penalty reductions that are achieved through the EU Leniency Program.

References

  • Feinberg, R. M., Kim, H., & Park, M. The determinants of cartel duration in Korea. Review of Industrial Organization. doi:10.1007/s11151-016-9505-4.

  • Ghosal, V., & Sokol, D. D. Evolution of U.S. and European cartel enforcement and prosecutions. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.

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  • Posner, R. A. (1970). A statistical study of antitrust enforcement. Journal of Law and Economics, 13(2), 365–419.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, American University, Washington, DC, 20016-8029, USA

    Robert M. Feinberg

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  1. Robert M. Feinberg
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Correspondence to Robert M. Feinberg.

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Feinberg, R.M. Cartel Stability: Determinants and International Evidence. Rev Ind Organ 48, 357–359 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9503-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9503-6

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