Cartel Stability: Determinants and International Evidence
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This special issue examines empirically the determinants of cartel formation, stability, and duration with the use of international evidence. Levenstein and Suslow examine the US experience; Zhou considers the problem of recidivism in cartel formation in Europe; Ghosal and Sokol examine both US and European experience with a focus on US policy changes; and Feinberg et al. analyze a recent entrant into strong antitrust enforcement: South Korea.
KeywordsCartel stability International antitrust Antitrust policy
- Feinberg, R. M., Kim, H., & Park, M. The determinants of cartel duration in Korea. Review of Industrial Organization. doi: 10.1007/s11151-016-9505-4.
- Ghosal, V., & Sokol, D. D. Evolution of U.S. and European cartel enforcement and prosecutions. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar
- Levenstein, M., & Suslow, V. Price-fixing hits home: An empirical study of U.S. price fixing conspiracies. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar
- Zhou, J. The rise and fall of cartels with multi-market colluders. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar