Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 48, Issue 4, pp 357–359 | Cite as

Cartel Stability: Determinants and International Evidence



This special issue examines empirically the determinants of cartel formation, stability, and duration with the use of international evidence. Levenstein and Suslow examine the US experience; Zhou considers the problem of recidivism in cartel formation in Europe; Ghosal and Sokol examine both US and European experience with a focus on US policy changes; and Feinberg et al. analyze a recent entrant into strong antitrust enforcement: South Korea.


Cartel stability International antitrust Antitrust policy 


  1. Feinberg, R. M., Kim, H., & Park, M. The determinants of cartel duration in Korea. Review of Industrial Organization. doi: 10.1007/s11151-016-9505-4.
  2. Ghosal, V., & Sokol, D. D. Evolution of U.S. and European cartel enforcement and prosecutions. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar
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  4. Levenstein, M., & Suslow, V. Price-fixing hits home: An empirical study of U.S. price fixing conspiracies. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar
  5. Marvao, C. (2016). The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism. Review of Industrial Organization, 48(1), 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  8. Zhou, J. The rise and fall of cartels with multi-market colluders. Review of Industrial Organization, this issue.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsAmerican UniversityWashingtonUSA

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