Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 355–366 | Cite as

Behavioral Economics and U.S. Antitrust Policy

  • Elizabeth M. BaileyEmail author


Modern day antitrust policy is grounded firmly in neoclassical economics. It is important, however, to test whether the modelling assumptions accord with the facts. It is also important to assess whether behavior that deviates from the conventional assumptions is systematic and persistent. If the relevant facts suggest that consumers or firms might behave in ways that depart from conventional assumptions, then private parties, government agencies and the courts should consider alternate economic models that account appropriately for the observed behavior.


Antitrust Behavioral economics Competition policy Mergers 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Haas School of BusinessUniversity of California, BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA
  2. 2.NERA Economic ConsultingSan FranciscoUSA

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