Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp 207–230 | Cite as

Industry Characteristics and Anti-Competitive Behavior: Evidence from the European Commission’s Decisions

  • Jordi Gual
  • Núria Mas


We analyze all the European Commission’s decisions on antitrust cases between 1999 and 2004 using a unique dataset that also contains information on all the cases that were filed for the Commission’s consideration but were never pursued. This data allow us to determine whether there is any type of bias in the selection process followed by the Commission when deciding which cases to pursue until a final decision is reached. We find that the selection of cases is not random and that it is quite efficient but not very significant. We also find that the economic literature criteria are important for the Commission’s decisions.


Antitrust European Commission Selection bias 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IESE Business SchoolBarcelonaSpain

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