The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 365–369 | Cite as

John J. Pitney and John-Clark Levin, Private anti-piracy navies: How warships for hire are changing maritime security

Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014. vi + 280 Pages. $72.00 (hardcover).


  1. Benson, B. (1989). The spontaneous evolution of commercial law. Southern Economic Journal, 55, 644–661.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Friedman, D. (1989). The machinery of freedom (2nd ed.). Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  3. Kontorovich, E. (2010). A Guantanamo on the sea: the difficulty of prosecuting pirate and terrorists. California Law Review, 98(1), 243–275.Google Scholar
  4. Leeson, P. (2010). Rationality, pirates, and the law: a retrospective. The American University Law Review, 59(5), 1219–1230.Google Scholar
  5. Rogers, D., Smith, A., & Wilson, B. (2013). Violence, access, and competition in the market for protection. The European Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Smith, A., Skarbeck, D., & Wilson, B. (2012). Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations. Social Choice and Welfare, 38(2), 325–353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Smith, A., Houser, D., Leeson, P., & Ostad, R. (2014). The costs of conflict. The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 97, 67–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Snow, N. (2012). Rumrunners, hooligans, and politicians: essays on the political economy of intervention. Dissertation, George Mason University.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of ManagementFerris State UniversityBig RapidsUSA

Personalised recommendations