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The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 365–369 | Cite as

John J. Pitney and John-Clark Levin, Private anti-piracy navies: How warships for hire are changing maritime security

Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014. vi + 280 Pages. $72.00 (hardcover).
  • David J. Hebert
Article
  • 131 Downloads

Private Anti-Piracy Navies: How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Securityis an examination of the private efforts to quell pirate attacks around the Horn of Africa, focusing mainly on these activities since 2008 but also including a historical discussion of pirate activities since the 1991 collapse of Siad Barre’s government in Somalia. The private response to piracy in this region is a recent phenomenon designed to fill the gaps left by large military vessels. These military vessels, the authors describe, are highly effective at deterring piracy in general but, owing to their size and cost, are unable to effectively prevent smaller pirate ships that are widely dispersed. As they put it, “navy warships are like Iker Casillas, the top [soccer] goalkeeper in the world. Although Casillas can block almost any shot he can reach, if a dozen small children are taking shots on goal simultaneously, even Casillas cannot keep all the balls out of the net” (76). This book is primarily...

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of ManagementFerris State UniversityBig RapidsUSA

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