The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 63–75 | Cite as

Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table



Scott’s (2009) research on stateless Southeast Asia describes behavioral patterns amidst indigenous peoples that parallel certain contemporary social phenomena, especially, prohibition and military occupation. Unintended consequences caused by government are continuously interpreted to reaffirm the rationale for interventionism. Governments’ role in social processes involving violence is presumed necessary and sufficient. As a result of conceptual biases, non-governmental processes such as markets and civil society are ignored as sources for potential solutions to complex social problems. Comparative political economy should take more seriously models developed by the tradition of constitutional political economy and classical liberalism wherein the state is recognized as a significant threat to social order.


Statelessness Political Economy Prohibition Occupation Terrorism 


N15 H11 Z13 K42 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loyola University New OrleansNew OrleansUSA

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