The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 19, Issue 2–3, pp 113–123 | Cite as

Retrogressive regime drift within a theory of emergent order

  • Richard E. Wagner


This paper explores the robustness of systems of political economy from within an emergent perspective. Robustness is a quality of the nexus of relationships that emerge within a political economy, and particular attention is given to processes of regime drift that might generate retrogression within a political economy. The central claim advanced here is that robustness is facilitated through polycentric organizational arrangements that entail high degeneracy, while fragility and the emergence of decadence is facilitated in relatively hierarchical arrangements that possess low degeneracy.


Degeneracy Emergence Fiscal sociology Ordnungstheorie Polycentricity Robustness 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, 3G4George Mason UniversityFairfax

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