Public Choice

, Volume 152, Issue 3–4, pp 445–449 | Cite as

The unanimity rule revisited: the case of revisions of hybrid constitutions



Hybrid Constitution International Treaty Unanimity Rule Constitutional Economic Revision Rule 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Law and School of Business and EconomicsHumboldt UniversityBerlinGermany

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