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Notes
Of course, “legitimate breach” might be difficult to identify objectively, if the contract is vague or complex.
De Jasay (2002) notes that more than a few people carry this argument several steps further. In one sense, we would not have property or be able to secure that property without the efforts of the “dog,” usually thought of as the state and its powers to enforce the contract. But since the dog is necessary for property to be secure, one might argue that the dog actually “owns” the house, or at least that the owner owes the dog a great debt, because without the dog the owner would have no place to stay. De Jasay is jesting, of course, but some version of arguments very close to “your dog owns your house” are common in political discourse.
“In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses” (Rousseau 1762/1913: Book I, Chap. 7; emphasis added).
“If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, their opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from being included in it. They are foreigners among citizens. When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sovereign” (Rousseau 1762/1913: Book IV, Chap. 2).
Space prevents a real review of contractarianism in political theory. But an excellent source is Chap. 2 in Brennan and Buchanan (1985).
Buchanan (2007: 211) points out that, “there is a categorical separation between the market and the political relationship between and among interacting persons. In the stylized limit, that of fully competitive markets for both, inputs and outputs, the individual faces no costs of exit from any relationship. The individual is maximally free from the power of others. In dramatic contrast, the individual in a political relationship is necessarily subject to the exercise of some power or authority by another. In the stylized limit, this power is absolute: no exit is possible, regardless of cost.”
It is no accident, in this sense, that the image of Odysseus tied to the mast was chosen as the logo for the journal Constitutional Political Economy (see Brennan and Kliemt 1990).
Some extensions of this argument, and some problems with its logic, are reviewed in Munger (2011). This paragraph and the one that follows were adapted from that paper.
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With thanks to Geoffrey Brennan and William Keech, though no one bears any blame for the errors that remain.
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Munger, M.C. Coercion, the state, and the obligations of citizenship. Public Choice 152, 415–421 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9992-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9992-2