Public Choice

, Volume 154, Issue 1–2, pp 21–37 | Cite as

Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system



Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules.


Entrepreneurship Congressional committee system Collective action Institutions 

JEL Classification

L26 D71 D72 D02 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Development Research Institute, Economic DepartmentNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics and FinanceUtah State UniversityLoganUSA

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