Bureaucrats and short-term politics
This paper proposes a simple probabilistic voting model where the society consists of three groups of voters belonging to different generations. Since the youngest generation is excluded from participating in elections, the political process results in an allocation of public expenditures that is shifted towards public consumption. We show that the influence of bureaucrats who favor an excessive supply of public goods increases investment expenditures and limits the leeway of politicians to capture rents for themselves. Finally, we discuss the conditions under which the impact of bureaucrats is welfare-enhancing.
KeywordsPolitical agency Voting Bureaucracy
JEL ClassificationD 72 D 73 H 11
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Besley, T. (2006). Principled agents? London: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
- Fernandez, R., & Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty. American Economic Review, 81, 1146–1155. Google Scholar
- Mueller, D. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
- Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Aldine-Ahterton: New York. Google Scholar
- Niskanen, W. (2001). Bureaucracy. In W. F. Shughart & L. Razzolini (Eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Google Scholar
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics: Explaining economic policy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Google Scholar
- Rauch, J. E. (1995). Bureaucracy, infrastructure, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 85, 968–979. Google Scholar
- Weber, M. (1922/2001). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Google Scholar