Public Choice

, Volume 151, Issue 1–2, pp 149–163 | Cite as

Bureaucrats and short-term politics



This paper proposes a simple probabilistic voting model where the society consists of three groups of voters belonging to different generations. Since the youngest generation is excluded from participating in elections, the political process results in an allocation of public expenditures that is shifted towards public consumption. We show that the influence of bureaucrats who favor an excessive supply of public goods increases investment expenditures and limits the leeway of politicians to capture rents for themselves. Finally, we discuss the conditions under which the impact of bureaucrats is welfare-enhancing.


Political agency Voting Bureaucracy 

JEL Classification

D 72 D 73 H 11 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MunichMunichGermany

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