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Public Choice

, Volume 150, Issue 3–4, pp 651–670 | Cite as

Political parties and political shirking

  • Jason DeBacker
Article

Abstract

Using ADA roll call voting scores for the 1947–2006 period, I find that senators shirk in their last term. The degree of shirking is limited by political parties, which constrain the politician in his last term, and varies by post-Senate career choices. The results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics.

Keywords

Political parties Shirking Ideology 

JEL Classification

H11 D72 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.AlexandriaUSA

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