Public Choice

, Volume 144, Issue 3–4, pp 487–503 | Cite as

Sticking to fiscal plans: the role of institutions

  • Jürgen von Hagen


The rules-based fiscal framework of the EMU relies heavily on the development of medium-term fiscal plans by the EU governments. In this paper, I present an empirical analysis of the deviations from the plans presented in the annual Stability and Convergence Programs. I focus on projections for real GDP growth and general government balances, revenues and spending at different time horizons. I show that deviations from the projections presented in these Programs since 1999 can be explained by institutional factors, i.e., the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules.


EMU Fiscal institutions Fiscal policy Stability and convergence programs Stability and growth pact 

JEL Classification

H62 H63 H87 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IIWUniversity of BonnBonnGermany

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