Public Choice

, Volume 144, Issue 1–2, pp 133–151 | Cite as

Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring

The case of parliamentary agendas
  • Boniface Mbih
  • Sébastien Courtin
  • Issofa Moyouwou


It usually happens that the alternatives to be voted on in committees are chosen or sponsored by some particularly active committee members. For example, in parliaments, some representatives and some government members are known to be especially active in introducing bills on which the whole committee will later vote. It appears that parliamentary agendas—namely amendment and successive elimination voting rules—are vulnerable to strategic behavior by groups of individuals introducing motions which are not their most preferred alternatives. Our aim in this paper is to evaluate how frequently this type of behavior arises.


Parliamentary agendas Sponsoring Strategic behavior Impartial anonymous culture 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Boniface Mbih
    • 1
  • Sébastien Courtin
    • 1
  • Issofa Moyouwou
    • 2
  1. 1.CREM UMR CNRS 6211, Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de GestionUniversité de CaenCaenFrance
  2. 2.Ecole Normale SupérieureYaoundéCameroun

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