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Public Choice

, 142:151 | Cite as

Strategic political commentary

  • Todd D. Kendall
Article

Abstract

I model the media’s role in transmitting information to voters in a strategic framework. Media outlets in which commentators speak primarily to voters of like type face strong incentives to reveal private information about political choices truthfully, while “mainstream” outlets observed by all types of voters face mixed incentives. Also, the number of preference-matched news outlets determines the informativeness of the mainstream media; a general increase in the number of news outlets does not necessarily improve the quality of information conveyed by the media. The model also rationalizes why commentators of a single political preference predominate in the mainstream media.

Keywords

Media Political communication Cheap talk Media bias 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Compass LexeconChicagoUSA

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