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Public Choice

, 141:467 | Cite as

War and peace—cyclical phenomena?

  • Adam Knut Sture Jacobsson
Article

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how the analysis can differ dramatically between two common static modeling approaches to conflict. The first approach uses a one-period setup and associates positive arms investments with conflict. The second approach has two periods, where arming decisions are taken in the first period, and the decision on whether to go to war is taken separately in the second. Building on the latter approach, I introduce a repeated game protocol with myopic players. Under these circumstances countries may end up in cycles of war and peace. This result offers a novel explanation for a common pattern in history.

Keywords

Appropriative competition Armed conflict Cyclical behavior 

JEL Classification

D74 C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stockholm UniversityStockholmSweden

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