War and peace—cyclical phenomena?
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This paper demonstrates how the analysis can differ dramatically between two common static modeling approaches to conflict. The first approach uses a one-period setup and associates positive arms investments with conflict. The second approach has two periods, where arming decisions are taken in the first period, and the decision on whether to go to war is taken separately in the second. Building on the latter approach, I introduce a repeated game protocol with myopic players. Under these circumstances countries may end up in cycles of war and peace. This result offers a novel explanation for a common pattern in history.
KeywordsAppropriative competition Armed conflict Cyclical behavior
JEL ClassificationD74 C72
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