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Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?

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Abstract

Although forbidden in democratic states a market for votes could improve efficiency. This paper examines the way trading votes will change the outcome of an election. A two-party model with two phases is presented. In the pre-trading phase the two parties set their agendas consisting of a direct subsidy and an income tax. In the trading phase voters buy and sell votes. On the basis of rational voter behavior and a given income distribution, it is shown that the outcome of the election depends mainly on how the selling voters are distributed among the voters.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Seidelstrasse 20, 07749, Jena, Germany

    Frank Daumann

  2. Mathematical Department, University of Bayreuth, 95440, Bayreuth, Germany

    Alfred Wassermann

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  1. Frank Daumann
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  2. Alfred Wassermann
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Correspondence to Frank Daumann.

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Daumann, F., Wassermann, A. Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?. Public Choice 139, 429–441 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9402-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9402-6

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