Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules
- 107 Downloads
In this paper, I study elections where voters are strategic. I find that the commonly used voting rules, such as Plurality Rule, Majority Rule, Approval Voting, and Single Transferable Vote, do not always select the Condorcet Winner and suffer from multiple equilibria. Multi-stage voting rules offer a way to get around this problem. I introduce two voting rules—Multi-Stage Runoff and the Nominate-Two Rule—that select the Condorcet Winner as the unique equilibrium outcome under mild conditions. I show that a third class of voting rules—Binary Voting Trees—also select the Condorcet Winner.
KeywordsVoting rules Strategic voting Approval voting Single transferable vote
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2007). Sequential elimination vs. instantaneous voting (Working paper). Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Google Scholar
- Barberá, S., & Coelho, D. (2004). On the rule of k names (Working paper). Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Google Scholar
- Bartholdi, J. D., III, & Orlin, J. B. (1991). Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 8, 341–354. Google Scholar
- Buenrostro, L., Dhillon, A., & Vida, P. (2007). Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability (Working paper). University of Warwick. Google Scholar
- Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
- Dellis, A. (2006). Extending Duverger’s law (Working paper). University of Hawaii. Google Scholar
- Farquharson, R. (1969). Theory of voting. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
- Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Google Scholar
- Miller, N. (1995). Committees, agendas, and voting. London: Harwood Academic. Google Scholar
- Palfrey, T. (1989). A mathematical proof of Duverger’s law. In P. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics (pp. 69–92). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar