Public Choice

, Volume 135, Issue 3–4, pp 375–397 | Cite as

The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror



This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.


Terrorism Foreign aid Education 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE & IDEI) and Institut Universitaire de FranceUniversity of Toulouse 1ToulouseFrance
  2. 2.Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE)University of Toulouse 1ToulouseFrance

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