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Public Choice

, Volume 135, Issue 3–4, pp 91–107 | Cite as

Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy

  • Hugh M. Arce
  • Robert B. Koopman
  • Marinos Tsigas
Article

Abstract

Most analyses of US congressional votes on trade policy identify political and economic factors, and general economic conditions as significant factors. In this paper we examine whether simulated state-level impacts of trade policy changes obtained from an applied general equilibrium model explain recent US Senate votes on trade bills. We find that simulated gross state product effects are good predictors of recent trade-policy votes. Our model-based measures of trade sensitivity perform slightly better in statistical terms than the more traditional economic measures. For the Senate as a whole, import considerations have a larger impact on senate voting than export considerations.

Keywords

US trade policy Congressional voting State-level impacts Applied general equilibrium 

JEL

F13 D72 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hugh M. Arce
    • 1
  • Robert B. Koopman
    • 1
  • Marinos Tsigas
    • 1
  1. 1.US International Trade CommissionWashingtonUSA

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