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Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy

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Abstract

Most analyses of US congressional votes on trade policy identify political and economic factors, and general economic conditions as significant factors. In this paper we examine whether simulated state-level impacts of trade policy changes obtained from an applied general equilibrium model explain recent US Senate votes on trade bills. We find that simulated gross state product effects are good predictors of recent trade-policy votes. Our model-based measures of trade sensitivity perform slightly better in statistical terms than the more traditional economic measures. For the Senate as a whole, import considerations have a larger impact on senate voting than export considerations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. US International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA

    Hugh M. Arce, Robert B. Koopman & Marinos Tsigas

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  1. Hugh M. Arce
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  2. Robert B. Koopman
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  3. Marinos Tsigas
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Correspondence to Marinos Tsigas.

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This paper represents solely the views of the authors and does not represent the views of the US International Trade Commission or any of its Commissioners.

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Arce, H.M., Koopman, R.B. & Tsigas, M. Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy. Public Choice 135, 91–107 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9240-3

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