Public Choice

, Volume 133, Issue 3–4, pp 269–273 | Cite as

Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?

  • Rob Roy McGregor
Editorial Comments


The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process.


Federal Open Market Committee FOMC Federal Reserve Federal Reserve transparency Federal Reserve bureaucratic objectives 




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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Belk College of BusinessUNC CharlotteCharlotteUSA

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