Public Choice

, Volume 133, Issue 1–2, pp 231–251 | Cite as

Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?

  • Per G. Fredriksson
  • Eric Neumayer
  • Gergely Ujhelyi


Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.


Corruption Political economy Agreements Ratification Environmentalism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Per G. Fredriksson
    • 1
  • Eric Neumayer
    • 2
  • Gergely Ujhelyi
    • 3
  1. 1.University of LouisvilleLouisvilleUSA
  2. 2.London School of EconomicsLondonUK
  3. 3.Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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