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Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information

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Abstract

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which one player has private information about his own valuation of the prize. This valuation may be either high or low. All other players have a known and identical valuation of the prize. We present necessary and sufficient conditions under which the privately informed player exerts a positive or zero equilibrium effort.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara M. Winkel

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  1. Lambert Schoonbeek
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  2. Barbara M. Winkel
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Correspondence to Lambert Schoonbeek.

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Schoonbeek, L., Winkel, B.M. Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information. Public Choice 127, 123–132 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y

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