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Public Choice

, Volume 126, Issue 3–4, pp 367–385 | Cite as

Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions

  • Geneviève Tellier
Article

Abstract

It is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures. However, Frey and Schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous. Only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals, and when popularity is low, energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election. Data draw from the Canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis. The findings support the Frey and Schneider explanation.

Keywords

Empirical Study Public Finance Public Expenditure Canadian Province Government Ideology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ManagementUniversity of OttawaOttawaCanada

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