The economic effects of constitutions

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Economics, Georgia Southern University, P.O. Box 8152, Statesboro, GA, 30460-8152, U.S.A.
Michael Reksulak

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Michael Reksulak
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Reksulak, M. The economic effects of constitutions. Public Choice 127, 235–240 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-1054-1

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