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Public Choice

, Volume 127, Issue 3–4, pp 251–265 | Cite as

An economic analysis of voting in Sweden

  • Henrik Jordahl
Article

Abstract

Using data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment, I compare the impact of macro- and microeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is that macroeconomic variables influence the vote a bit more than microeconomic variables do. In consequence, both self-interest and public interest appear to be important explanations of economic voting in Sweden. Macroeconomic variables have, however, been much more influential in determining election outcomes. Since previous studies of economic voting have used cross-sectional data only, it is also worth noting that panel estimates indicate a much greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote than cross-sectional estimates do.

Keywords

Panel Data Public Choice Macroeconomic Variable Left Wing Individual Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden
  2. 2.Ratio InstituteSweden

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