Public Choice

, Volume 122, Issue 3–4, pp 501–512 | Cite as

Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA, U.S.A.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 2 vols.; 1, 112 pages. USD 370.00/GBP 245.00 (cloth).

  • Daniel J. Mitchell
Review article


Public Finance Budget Deficit International Library Critical Writing 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel J. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.The Heritage FoundationU.S.A.

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