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Public Choice

, Volume 124, Issue 3–4, pp 391–409 | Cite as

The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence

  • Andreas Freytag
Article

Abstract

The history of monetary policy is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. The exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment, the constraining influence of institutions and a new variable for ex-ante credibility of the reform. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Public Finance Exogenous Variable Inflation Rate Econometric Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsFSU JenaJenaGermany

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