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Public Choice

, Volume 121, Issue 1–2, pp 51–67 | Cite as

A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology

  • Claudio A. Bonilla
Article

Abstract

This study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition. I develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment. Three important results arise for thehomogeneous-polity case. First, the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election. Second,a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party. Third,political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate.

Keywords

Public Finance Political Competition Underlie Space Incumbent Candidate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claudio A. Bonilla
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad del DesarrolloSantiago de ChileChile

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