Abstract
This study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition. I develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment. Three important results arise for thehomogeneous-polity case. First, the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election. Second,a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party. Third,political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate.
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Bonilla, C.A. A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology. Public Choice 121, 51–67 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-6157-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-6157-y