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Public Choice

, Volume 121, Issue 3–4, pp 391–412 | Cite as

Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives

  • K. Kanthak
Article

Abstract

Most studies of committee agency in theU.S. House of Representatives consider theideological location of the committee’smedian with respect to some agent. Littlestudied, however, is the effect committeeagency may have on legislators seekingcommittee assignments. I show that whencommittees are agents to the party,legislators feel pressure to selectideological positions more proximate to theparty. They respond to this pressure byexhibiting voting behavior more similar tothe preferences of the party median. Committee assignments, then, are a means bywhich parties can influence the votingbehavior of their members.

Keywords

Public Finance Vote Behavior Committee Assignment Committee Agency Party Median 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. Kanthak
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonU.S.A

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