Abstract
Most studies of committee agency in theU.S. House of Representatives consider theideological location of the committee’smedian with respect to some agent. Littlestudied, however, is the effect committeeagency may have on legislators seekingcommittee assignments. I show that whencommittees are agents to the party,legislators feel pressure to selectideological positions more proximate to theparty. They respond to this pressure byexhibiting voting behavior more similar tothe preferences of the party median. Committee assignments, then, are a means bywhich parties can influence the votingbehavior of their members.
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Kanthak, K. Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives. Public Choice 121, 391–412 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-1685-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-1685-z