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Decentralization, Partisan Politics, and National Development in Ghana

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Abstract

This study examines the relationship between decentralization reforms and political parties from the perspective of citizens. It is based on a national sample survey of 3018 citizens from 72 districts of Ghana. The findings show that the majority of the respondents believe that the process is already political, which is inconsistent with a party-free local government system per the 1992 Constitution. Interesting, though, is the fact that less than 20% would want to see a partisan local government system. Majority of the respondents (70%) also indicated that the District Chief Executives should be elected rather than appointed by the President.

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  1. GIMPA School of Public Service and Governance, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, P.O. Box AH 50,, Greenhill, Achimota, Ghana

    Samuel Adams & Kingsley Agomor

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  1. Samuel Adams
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  2. Kingsley Agomor
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Correspondence to Samuel Adams.

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Adams, S., Agomor, K. Decentralization, Partisan Politics, and National Development in Ghana. Public Organiz Rev 20, 351–366 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-019-00442-8

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