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A new defense of trope content view of experience

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Abstract

The idea that what we perceive are tropes (abstract particulars) is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue.

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Notes

  1. Regarding the advantages of the content view, see Nanny (2016). Regarding the irreducible subjective character of experience, qualia, see Bensusan amd Carvalho (2011). There are two fundamentally different ways of conceiving perceptual experience. The first one is this: experience has content. When I see a yellow cube straight ahead, I represent the world as being a certain way, that is, my perceptual states have conditions of satisfactions (see Searle 1983). When there is a match between how the world is and the way that our experiences reflect it, the content is veridical; on the other hand, when there is a mismatch, the content is falsidical. According to Campbell, we may call this “the content view” of perceptual experience (See Campbell 2002). Different versions of the “content view” have become popular since the seminal works of Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968) and Dretske (1969). The second view is the following: experience is a matter of putting the agent in contact with particulars. In accordance with Campbell, we may label this the “relational view” (see Campbell 2002). Versions of this view were popular amongst the early twentieth-century Oxford Realists, such as Russell (see 1912), but the recent work of Campbell, Johnston, Brewer, Fish, and Martin have brought the proposal back into discussion (See Johnston 2004; Brewer 2006; Fish 2009; Martin 2002; Travis 2004). Martin calls his position “naïve realism” (See Martin 2002); while Brewer calls his the “object view” (See Brewer 2006). However, I prefer Campbell’s label: the “relational view” (See Campbell 2002). In this paper, I take the content view for granted, without assuming the onus of arguing for it.

  2. See Searle (1983, p. 63).

  3. See Schellenberg (2010).

  4. See Schellenberg (2010).

  5. See Tye (2009, pp. 78–80).

  6. As Tye puts it: “intuitively, I misperceive that cube. My experience misrepresents it” (2009, p. 80. Original emphasis).

  7. That is what Lewis has call “veridical hallucinations”. See Lewis (1980). I have used this famous scenario at least twice: Pereira (2016, 2018).

  8. See Tye (2009).

  9. See Schellenberg (2010).

  10. See Tye (2014).

  11. See Mulligan et al. (1984) and Lowe (1998).

  12. See Nanay (2012).

  13. See Grice (1961).

  14. See Davies (1992, p. 26).

  15. See McGinn (1982).

  16. This experiment was proposed by Tye (2009, p. 79). Recently Schellenberg has presented the same experiment a little modified. See Schellenberg (2016).

    However, in my paper of 2012 (Pereira 2012), I show how a General content view could circumvent this objection by assuming that the general content is relativistic, namely a complex property that is true or false of particular with which we are acquainted rather then represent.

  17. See Tye (2009, pp. 79–80).

  18. That is Searle’s main mistake in (1983). See Bach (2007).

  19. See Campbell (1990), Bacon (1995) and Schaffer (2001).

  20. See Campbell (1990).

  21. See Bacon (1995).

  22. See footnote 20.

  23. See Campbell (1981, p. 481).

  24. Mulligan et al (1984, p. 300).

  25. See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, pp. 93–95). Siegel gives a very similar argument in (2005, 2009). See also Nanay (2012).

  26. See Tye (2009, p. 83).

  27. See Tye (2009, p. 83).

  28. See Searle (1983).

  29. See Tye (2009) and Schellenberg (2010).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, The Federal University from Rio de Janeiro/UFRJ/CNPQ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira

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de Sá Pereira, R.H. A new defense of trope content view of experience. Philos Stud 176, 1757–1768 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1089-4

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