Abstract
Constituent ontologies maintain that the properties of an object are either parts or something very much like parts of that object. Recently, such a view has been criticized as (i) leading to a bizarre and problematic form of substance dualism and (ii) implying the existence of impossible objects. After briefly presenting constituent and relational ontologies, I respond to both objections, arguing that constituent ontology does not yield either of these two consequences and so is not shown to be an unacceptable ontological framework.
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Notes
van Inwagen (2011) attempts to criticize constituent ontology generally, though his critique mainly rests on his claim that the terms or concepts employed by constituent ontologies are unintelligible or confused. I won’t address van Inwagen’s objection here, though it seems that his critique would only be an attack on specific versions of constituent ontologies that employ terms or concepts which are (allegedly) incoherent or unintelligible, whereas other versions may employ terms or concepts that are not.
Though Lowe (2012) offers an Aristotelian framework that does not fit in either a relational or constituent ontological framework.
Armstrong (1989) includes both nominalism and relational ontology as being “blob” ontologies.
Olson’s remarks are a bit overstated since the constituent ontologist can ask all of those questions raised for relational ontologists, for the constituent ontologist also accepts that concrete objects have a mereological structure.
Olson also attempts to demotivate constituent ontology by suggesting that it cannot adequately account for character-possession of concrete individuals, and like relational ontologies, will have to ultimately allow for “brute character,” i.e. the unanalyzable possession of character by some object. I won’t contest Olson here given that the aim of this paper is not to motivate constituent ontology but to defend it from the criticisms that Olson raises. Nevertheless, constituent ontology can be motivated for reasons independent of character-possession, and this is especially true if hylomorphism counts as a constituent ontology—whereby reasons in favor of hylomorphism as the best analysis of material objects would thereby count as reasons in favor of constituent ontology.
Even if mental properties were identical or reducible to physical properties, Olson notes that a similar problem would still arise due to the existence of an object composed only of physical properties except the non-mental physical properties, leaving us with a “massless, shapeless, colorless mind” (ibid.).
Some might demur over this claim, suggesting that a property may be a part of an object without characterizing that object (cf. McDaniel 2001). I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
Olson does consider restricting composition as a possible response to his objections (ibid., 15–16 typescript), but he mainly focuses on it as a response to his second objection (which I discuss below) and rejects such a move as failing to address that objection.
At some places, Olson seems to suggest that we have cells as parts (cf. Olson 1997: 137). If so, then the last clause should be amended as: “and hence Olson concludes that I have only cells and simple particles as proper parts.” I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. However, Olson’s discussion of the link between animalism and sparse ontology (especially in Olson 2007: 222–223) seems also to suggest that he believes only animals and simple particles exist. On either view, however, he would deny the existence of the “problematic” proper parts.
The definiens should include that the xs are non-overlapping, but Olson leaves that clause out to make the objection easier to state, and so I leave it out as well.
Olson thinks similar arguments can be employed when considering the shape or atomic structure of objects.
At best, particles would partially compose me, but Olson rightly notes that this doesn’t fit with the typical claim by constituent ontologists (forthcoming: 14 typescript).
An anonymous reviewer points out that it might not be absurd to suppose that atoms do not compose me (or anything else), for McDaniel (2001) argues that ordinary objects are not composed of fundamental particles but are rather composed of fundamental particles and properties (though McDaniel does claim that there are sums composed of fundamental particles, but they are distinct from ordinary objects). Although I agree that it may not be absurd to claim that atoms do not compose ordinary objects, the proposal I am offering allows us to maintain with Olson that (there is a sense in which) I am composed of atoms.
The labels ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’ are not always used in the same sense by different philosophers, such that some may hesitate to call properties, and especially tropes, as ‘abstract.’ Olson, however, is willing to call properties ‘abstract’ or at least ‘quasi-abstract.’ For this paper, what matters is that properties belong in a different ontological category than material objects, and let ‘abstract’ designate the former type and ‘concrete’ the latter type.
See also Simons (1987) for a gesture towards parthood pluralism.
He offers the following two definitions for the generic notions (where ‘constituent’ is used in a non-mereological sense that captures the relation between property and object asserted by constituent ontologists):
(a) x is a PART of y =df x is a part or a constituent of y, and
(b) the xs compose y =df each of the xs is PART of y, and every PART of y shares a PART with one or more of the xs.
But Olson offers no reason for accepting such a gerrymandered notion of parthood.
Regarding super-substantivalism, an object (which is identical to some space–time region) is composed (in one sense) by points of space–time, whereas it is also composed (in a distinct sense) by its properties.
For more on the history of this kind of parthood pluralism, see Normore and Brown (2014).
Of course, substratum theories and bundles theories can also be tracked back to Locke and Hume, respectively (and there is no clear evidence that either of them would endorse parthood pluralism). Nevertheless, I maintain that parthood pluralism (that distinguishes metaphysical parthood and integral parthood) should be adopted by any constituent ontology.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. Thanks also to Stephen T. Davis for helpful discussion on some of these issues.
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Yang, E. Defending constituent ontology. Philos Stud 175, 1207–1216 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0903-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0903-8