Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 8, pp 2045–2062 | Cite as

Perception and cognitive phenomenology

Article

Abstract

In this paper I consider the uses to which certain psychological phenomena—e.g. cases of seeing as, and linguistic understanding—are put in the debate about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that we need clear definitions of the terms ‘sensory phenomenology’ and ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to understand the import of these phenomena. I make a suggestion about the best way to define these key terms, and, in the light of it, show how one influential argument against cognitive phenomenology fails.

Keywords

Perception Sensory phenomenology Cognitive phenomenology Intentional content Concepts 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Tim Crane, Laura Gow, Cory Juhl, Mohan Matthen, Jon Morgan, Casey O'Callaghen, David Pitt, and Galen Strawson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

  1. Brentano, F. (1874/1973, 1995). Psychology from an empirical standpoint (L. McAlister, A. Rancurello, & D. B. Terrell, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  2. Carruthers, P. (1998). Natural theories of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 6, 203–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A naturalist theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little Brown.Google Scholar
  5. Dennett, D. (1993). Precis of Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(4), 889–892.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  7. Fodor, J. (1990). The theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Georgalis, N. (2005). The primacy of the subjective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  9. Husserl, E. (1900-1901/2001). Logical investigations (Vols. 1 and 2, J. N. Findlay with revised translations by Dermot Moran, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  10. Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A self-representational theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  12. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). The phenomenology of perception (Colin Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  13. Montague, M. (2016). The Given: Experience and its content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Moore, G. E. (1910-11/1953). ‘Propositions’, in his some main problems in philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin.Google Scholar
  15. O’Callaghan, C. (2011). Against hearing meanings. The Philosophical Quarterly, 61(245), 783–807.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. O’Callaghan, C. (2015). Speech perception. In M. Matthen (Ed.), Oxford handbook of the philosophy of perception (pp. 475–494). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Pautz, A. (2013). Does phenomenology ground mental content? In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Phenomenal intentionality: New essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Sartre, J. (1943/1956). Being and nothingness (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.Google Scholar
  19. Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 481–503). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Siegel, S. (2010). The contents of visual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of Consciousness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Siewert, C. (2011). Phenomenal Thought. In T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (pp. 236–267). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  23. Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  24. Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

Personalised recommendations