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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 8, pp 1885–1894 | Cite as

A defense of Tarski

Article
  • 233 Downloads

Abstract

Kit Fine has argued that the Tarski Semantics for the language of first order logic (FOL) is inadequate. A semantic theory for FOL is inadequate if there are formulae of FOL whose meanings or satisfaction conditions it cannot compositionally account for. It is argued here that Fine’s case against Tarski rests on a mistake.

Keywords

Tarski Compositionality First order logic Kit Fine Semantic relationism Logical content 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I thank Nathan Salmon and Tony Roy for discussion.

References

  1. Fine, K. (2003). The role of variables, Journal of Philosophy.Google Scholar
  2. Fine, K. (2007). Semantic Relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Fine, K. (2010). Comments of Scott Soames’ “Coordination Problems”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Google Scholar
  4. Hodges, W. (2001). Tarski’s Truth Definitions, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Google Scholar
  5. Soames, S. (2010). Coordination problems, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Google Scholar
  6. Tarski, A. (1944). The semantic conception of truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3), 341–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.California State University, NorthridgeNorthridgeUSA

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