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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 9, pp 2487–2509 | Cite as

Allocating confirmation with derivational robustness

  • Aki Lehtinen
Article

Abstract

Robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it is shown to depend on confirmed rather than disconfirmed assumptions. Although increasing the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it in such a case, robustness may also be irrelevant for confirmation, or may even disconfirm. Whether or not it confirms depends on the available data and on what other results have already been established.

Keywords

Robustness Indirect confirmation Climate models Diagrams 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This research was financially supported by the Academy of Finland. Thanks for Till Grüne-Yanoff, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Chiara Lisciandra, Uskali Mäki, Caterina Marchionni, Jani Raerinne and Jacob Stegenga for their comments on various versions of this paper. I also wish to thank Jouni Räisänen for directing me to some relevant climate modelling literature, and Jonah Schupbach for the Sherlock Holmes quote. Finally I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for exceptionally useful comments on the manuscript at the final stages. The usual disclaimers apply.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflicts of interest

There are no potential conflicts of interest concerning this paper. Humans or animals were not used in the research and thus there was no need to ask for anybody’s consent.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political and Economic Studies/Social and Moral PhilosophyUniversity of HelsinkiUniversity of HelsinkiFinland

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