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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 4, pp 947–967 | Cite as

The epistemic significance of experience

  • Alex Byrne
Article

Abstract

According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.

Keywords

Perception Knowledge Experience Belief Davidson 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to audiences at Berkeley, Birkbeck, Missouri, Rice, and Rutgers-Camden, and to James Genone, Nick Kroll, Lisa Miracchi, Susanna Schellenberg, Kieran Setiya and Susanna Siegel, for advice and assistance that greatly improved this paper. Special thanks to Nico Silins for comments that went far beyond the call of duty.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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