Skip to main content
Log in

Where grounding and causation part ways: comments on Schaffer

Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon (the “Unity Hypothesis”)? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In this paper, I present several concerns which suggest that the structural equation model does not transfer as smoothly from the case of causation to the case of grounding as Schaffer would have us believe. If it can in fact be shown that significant differences surface in how the formalism in question applies to the two types of phenomena in question, Schaffer’s attempt at establishing an analogy between grounding and causation has thereby been weakened and, as a result, the application of the Unity Hypothesis to the case of grounding once again stands in need of justification.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. In what follows, when I refer to Jonathan Schaffer’s work, I have in mind “Grounding in the Image of Causation” (this volume), unless otherwise noted.

  2. For an endorsement of the Unity Hypothesis, see for example (Audi 2012, p. 689; Rosen 2010, p. 114; Schaffer 2009, pp. 376–377).

  3. An interesting fourth option, which is well worth exploring further, is identified in Cameron (2015). Cameron challenges grounding theorists to consider the possibility that alleged grounding connections might exhibit a kind of unity that is weaker than that associated with the single-species or single-genus interpretation, but stronger than that associated with the mere-resemblance interpretation. The kind of unity in question, which Cameron brings to our attention, is that familiar from the Aristotelian notion of “pros hen” (or core-dependent) homonymy. As is well-known, when Aristotle says of certain central philosophical notions (e.g., being) that they are said in many ways, he often takes the notion in question to apply in a primary way to a certain central case (viz., substance) on which all the other applications of the notion are in some way dependent. Cameron issues the following challenge to grounding theorists. If a successful case cannot be made that alleged grounding connections fall under a single species or a single genus, and grounding theorists wish to avoid the charge of mere equivocation, then Aristotelian core-dependent homonymy ought to be considered as a possible fourth route towards a successful defense of the Unity Hypothesis. In that case, however, additional work is required of grounding theorists, since they must then establish that the notion of ground applies in a primary way to a certain central case on which all other alleged applications of the notion of ground are in some way dependent. To my knowledge, no extant account of grounding has availed itself, or is even particularly conducive to, the idea that ground is a core-dependent notion.

  4. I speak here of non-metaphysical causation, since some proponents of grounding, including Schaffer himself, have taken grounding to be a kind of causation, viz., metaphysical causation. I therefore employ the phrase, “non-metaphysical causation”, to pick out a causal determination relation which proponents of grounding would want to distinguish from whatever determination relation(s) these theorists intend to single out when they speak of grounding. For a very different construal of metaphysical causation, from within Aristotle’s framework, see Koslicki (2015b).

  5. Schaffer takes for granted, in his discussion, that the Unity Hypothesis is plausible for the case of causation. I will not challenge this claim, since my focus is on Schaffer’s analogy between grounding and causation. Thus, I am willing to grant Schaffer’s assumptions concerning causation, for the sake of the argument, and will call into question, in what follows, only Schaffer’s claim that grounding and causation in fact behave analogously in relevant respects. However, another possible route towards weakening Schaffer’s case in favor of the alleged generic unity of grounding would be to object to his assumption that causation exhibits at least the degree of unity indicative of the presence of a single genus.

  6. For further discussion of the application of the Unity Hypothesis to the case of grounding, see also Wilson (2014), especially Sect. V, “Is Grounding Needed as a General Unifier of the Specific Grounding Relations?”, pp. 567–575. Wilson considers (and rejects) the idea that the analogy between causation and grounding might serve as a possible route towards defending the unity of grounding (cf., Sect. V.iii, “Contrasting Grounding and Causation as Potential Unifiers”, p. 575).

  7. Again, in line with my remarks in the previous note, I will, for the purposes of this discussion, grant Schaffer’s assumption that the structural equation model does in fact yield a successful framework by means of which to approach causation, since I am currently concerned only with Schaffer’s attempt at establishing an analogy between grounding and causation by way of the thesis that the structural equation model applies equally well to both cases. A further strategy by which Schaffer’s proposed analogy between grounding and causation could be disputed would be to cast doubt on the successes he claims for structural equation approaches to causation.

  8. When Schaffer proposes to read the exogenous variables, in the alleged grounding scenario at hand, as representing the “fundamental” conditions (as opposed to the initial conditions, in the causal case), we must read him as having in mind relative, rather than absolute, fundamentality. Grounding theorists tend not to think of such states of affairs as the shirt’s being maroon as absolutely fundamental, i.e., as a state of affairs which does not obtain in virtue of some other more fundamental state of affairs’ obtaining. Thus, in Scenario 2, the exogenous variables should be understood as representing conditions which, relative to the scenario at hand, are assumed to be more fundamental than the dependent conditions represented by the endogenous variables; but they need not stand for conditions which are taken to be fundamental absolutely.

  9. In contrast, in the causal case, we are dealing with contingently occurring events, viz., the rock’s being thrown against the window and the window’s shattering. Even the causal connection which obtains between the rock’s being thrown against the window and the window’s shattering is not metaphysically necessary, though it is perhaps governed by some other form of necessity, e.g., nomological necessity.

  10. The threat of circularity cited here arises even when we take into consideration Schaffer’s remarks concerning the non-reductiveness of the structural equation approach to causation or grounding.

  11. The presence of two-way dependencies in the grounding case cited at the end of the previous section furthermore creates problems for a model’s success in predicting even the direction of the alleged grounding connection present in a given case.

References

  • Audi, P. (2012). Grounding: Toward a theory of the in-virtue-of relation. Journal of Philosophy, 109(12), 685–711.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, M. (2015). Is grounding said-in-many-ways? Studia Philosophica Estonica. Special issue on ontological priority and essence in Aristotle and Aristotelian Metaphysics, edited by Riin Sirkel and Tuomas Tahko.

  • Chalmers, D., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (Eds.). (2009). Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hale, B., & Hoffman, A. (Eds.). (2010). Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koslicki, K. (2015a). The coarse-grainedness of grounding. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 9, 306–349.

  • Koslicki, K. (2015b). The causal priority of form. Studia Philosophica Estonica. Special issue on ontological priority and essence in Aristotle and Aristotelian Metaphysics, edited by Riin Sirkel and Tuomas Tahko.

  • Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In B. Hale, & A. Hoffman (Eds.), pp. 109–136.

  • Schaffer, J. (2009). On what grounds what. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), pp. 347–383.

  • Schaffer, J. (2015). Grounding in the image of causation. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1.

  • Wilson, J. (2014). No work for a theory of grounding. Inquiry, 57(5–6), 535–579.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

These comments were presented at the 2014 Forty-First Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. I am grateful to the organizers, and especially Martin Thomson-Jones, for putting together the conference and this volume. Thanks also to Jonathan Schaffer as well as the other presenters and participants for their helpful feedback.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kathrin Koslicki.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Koslicki, K. Where grounding and causation part ways: comments on Schaffer. Philos Stud 173, 101–112 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0436-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0436-3

Keywords

Navigation