Priority monism and part/whole dependence
Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the only independent concrete object. The paper argues that, pace its proponents, Priority monism is in conflict with the dependence of any whole on any of its parts: if the cosmos does not depend on its parts, neither does any smaller composite.
KeywordsPriority monism Dependence Parts/wholes Schaffer, Jonathan
This paper has started out during a stretch of collaborative work with Robert Schwartzkopff. I’d like to thank him for discussing the material at various stages of completion. Thanks are also due to audiences at the Hamburg metaphysics research seminar, and workshops in Essen and Mainz, as well as to three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Work on this paper was partly funded by the DFG-ANR research project Nominalizations.
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