Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1813–1832 | Cite as

The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience



Some recently popular accounts of perception account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of the qualities of objects. My concern in this paper is with naturalistic versions of such a phenomenal externalist view. Focusing on visual spatial perception, I argue that naturalistic phenomenal externalism conflicts with a number of scientific facts about the geometrical characteristics of visual spatial experience.


Spatial perception Phenomenal character Phenomenal externalism Consciousness Visual space Geoemetry of visual experience Externalism Naturalism 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of WisconsinMadisonUSA

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