Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 8, pp 1985–1992 | Cite as

A devastating example for the Halfer Rule

  • Vincent Conitzer


How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple example for which the Halfer Rule prescribes credences that, I argue, cannot be reasonably held by anyone. In particular, these credences constitute an egregious violation of the Reflection Principle. I then discuss the consequences for halfing in general.


Sleeping Beauty problem Halfer Rule Reflection Principle Evidential selection procedures 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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