Philosophical Studies

, Volume 171, Issue 3, pp 513–515 | Cite as

Précis of Philosophy without intuitions

  • Herman Cappelen
Philosophy without intuitions (hereafter, ‘PWI’) is in many ways a simple book. It has a simple guiding question:

Guiding Question (GQ). Is it characteristic of philosophers that they rely on intuitions as evidence?

The central thesis of the book is also simple: the answer to GQ isNo’. A corollary is that all the work that assumes a positive answer, e.g. experimental philosophy and what I call ‘methodological rationalism’, is based on a false assumption.
For those familiar with the last 30 years of metaphilosophical debates, it should be easy to see the importance of the answer to GQ. A shared assumption among practically all participants in those debates is that the answer to GQ is ‘Yes’ (I call that thesis ‘Centrality’). However, no one has ever presented a detailed case for Centrality. I mean this literally: not even a page is devoted to setting out a careful case for a positive answer—it’s just assumed that the answer is ‘Yes’. 1This is a bizarre state of affairs. If someone...


Justificatory Status Normative Claim Intuitive Judgment Experimental Philosophy Philosophical Practice 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St AndrewsFifeUK

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