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Notes
Because of space limitations, I will restrict this discussion to visual experience.
What visually experiencing a property consists in is a matter of some controversy. For example, Intentionalists hold that visually experiencing a property involves representing it (e.g., representing that there is something yellow and crescent-shaped before one). By contrast, Naïve Realists hold that visually experiencing a property in the case of veridical experience involves seeing an instance of it, while in the case of hallucination and illusion, it consists in something else. The ensuing discussion will remain neutral on this issue.
For arguments to the effect that these kinds of properties can be visually experienced, see, e.g., Siegel (2006) (natural kind, artifactual kind, and semantic properties), Siegel (2009) (causal properties), Nanay forthcoming and Nanay (2011) (dispositional properties), McDowell (1982) (others’ mental states), and Cullison (2010) (moral properties). Of course, the lists of high- and low-level properties are not exhaustive; I have restricted them to the sorts of properties that have figured most prominently in the debate.
One might think that these debates can be solved by appeal to the correct theory of intentionality—if that theory says that a certain high-level property is part of the content of experience, then that’s the end of the matter. However, this strategy is impractical in light of the fact that there’s no consensus about what the correct theory of intentionality is. But more importantly, it’s arguable that this strategy couldn’t work even in principle: given that the contents of experiences are the explananda of theories of intentionality, we need to have already figured out what the contents of experiences are in order to determine which theory of intentionality is correct (Siegel 2006, p. 486).
This objection doesn’t apply to analogous arguments concerning some of the other types of high-level properties—in particular, those that don’t have a systematic connection with low-level properties (e.g., semantic properties). So for all I’ve said, the epistemological role route might work in those cases.
I’ve inserted ‘overall mental state’ where Siegel had ‘visual experiences’, since the starting point of her argument isn’t supposed to entail that the phenomenological difference is between the experiences (see Siegel 2006, p. 491).
Bayne (2009) offers another contrast argument—an argument from associative agnosia, a psychological condition involving impaired ability to recognize certain kinds of objects. Like Siegel’s argument, it’s based on a comparison of “before” and “after” phenomenology, but the relevant contrast is before and after agnosia affliction, rather than before and after acquisition of a recognitional disposition. I take it that Bayne’s argument is essentially Siegel’s with the contrast “reversed” (loss of a recognitional capacity as opposed to acquisition of one), and that my objection to the latter can be adapted to apply to the former.
The only objection to premise 3 she considers is that the phenomenal contrast can be explained in terms of a “non-representational feeling of familiarity”, and her reply is that there’s no reason to think there is any such thing (2006, pp. 497–498).
Sentiments in the vicinity of this objection can be found in Byrne (2009, p. 449).
Note that this argument can be adapted for other types of high-level properties.
This claim is controversial, but I’ll grant it for the sake of argument.
As Siegel anticipates (Siegel 2006, p. 501).
Bayne (2009, pp. 397–403) criticizes three other arguments against the claim that we can experience high-level properties, which would constitute arguments against the narrower thesis (K). Unfortunately, I don’t have the space to discuss them here; suffice it to say that I agree that none of them are decisive.
Thanks to Ophelia Deroy for suggesting something along the lines of this option.
Thanks to Philip Goff for pressing me to clarify this point.
Another possibility is that there is a fact of the matter as to whether (K) is true, but it is epistemically inaccessible to us. However, it’s not clear what reason we could have for thinking that there is an epistemically inaccessible fact of the matter, other than (i) an apparently irresolvable impasse with respect to (K), combined with (ii) an objection to the possibility of there being no fact of the matter. So consider my elaboration of the possibility that there is no fact of the matter as an indirect response to the claim that there is an epistemically inaccessible fact of the matter.
Perhaps because we impose these concepts on our mental lives even though they don’t pick out natural kinds (as suggested in Churchland 1981).
Cashing out the metaphor in terms of semantic indeterminacy is a viable option only if experiences don’t have a distinctive metaphysical structure, i.e., a structure that only experiences have (as “relational” or Naïve Realist theories claim of veridical experiences). For if it’s determinately the case that the subject is in a mental state that has this structure, then it’s determinately the case that ‘experience’ applies to it—if only experiences have this structure, a state’s having it is sufficient for the applicability of ‘experience’. So if (i) is satisfied, then (iii) isn’t.
Which of (i) or (ii) one chooses will depend on one’s metaphysics of experience—for reasons I don’t have the space to outline here, Naïve Realists are committed to (ii), whereas Intentionalism goes better with (i). In principle, there is a third possibility, namely, that it’s indeterminate whether the subject is in the state and whether it’s about a banana. Since I don’t see any reason for preferring this claim over (i) or (ii), I’m setting it aside.
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Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Phenomenal Qualities and Perception at the University of Hertfordshire, and a workshop on indeterminacy at the University of Leeds. Thanks to those in attendance for their helpful comments and questions. Special thanks to Louise Antony, Ross Cameron, Esa Diaz-Leon, Jennifer Matey, Elizabeth Schechter, Benedicte Veillet, and Robbie Williams for detailed comments on previous drafts of this paper.
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Logue, H. Visual experience of natural kind properties: is there any fact of the matter?. Philos Stud 162, 1–12 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9987-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9987-3