Skepticism: Lehrer versus Mooreanism
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I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical approach, if one does not prefer coherentism to foundationalism for other reasons.
KeywordsSkepticism Lehrer Mooreanism Easy knowledge Coherentism Foundationalism
The research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): J 3174-G15. I am very thankful to a referee for numerous helpful comments, to Martina Fürst for fruitful discussions and to Keith Lehrer, nomen est omen, my much admired teacher.
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