Philosophical Studies

, Volume 158, Issue 2, pp 343–360 | Cite as

Options and the subjective ought



Expected Utility Expect Utility Theory Practical Rationality Causal Decision Theory Evidential Decision Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I would like to thank Dan Greco, Caspar Hare, Richard Holton, Heather Logue, Tyler Paytas, Agustín Rayo, Miriam Schoenfield, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Noah Smith, Robert Stalnaker, Roger White, and Steve Yablo, as well as audiences at the 2011 MITing of the Minds Conference, the 2011 Bellingham Summer Philosophy, and the 2011 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, for very helpful comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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