Philosophical Studies

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 231–242 | Cite as

Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

  • Justin Snedegar


Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives.


Contrastivism Reasons Reason ascriptions Practical reasoning 



Thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Stephen Finlay, Ben Lennertz, Shyam Nair, Indrek Reiland, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Julia Staffel, Evan Tiffany, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper. Thanks most of all to Mark Schroeder, for many rounds of comments and discussion. My work on this paper was supported by the USC Oakley Fellowship.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Mudd Hall of PhilosophyUniversity of Southern CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

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