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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 3, pp 847–865 | Cite as

Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis

  • Susanna Siegel
Article

Reply to John Campbell

A straightforward way to challenge the Content View is to argue that there could be a visual perceptual experience that doesn’t have any contents. Since my type of experience contents have to be conveyed to the subject, and since I say those contents can be derived from the properties presented in experience, a way to pose this type of challenge is by giving a case in which a subject consciously experiences some properties, but those properties are not conveyed to the subject. Campbell tries to block the Content View in this way, by arguing that some creatures as a matter of course consciously experience properties, while those properties are not conveyed to them.

The conveying constraint says that for something to be a content of experience, it has to actually be conveyed to the subject. But being actually conveyed is itself a modal condition, consisting in being available for one of three functions: guiding action, belief-formation, and introspection. The...

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Natural Kind Visual Experience Phenomenal Character Representational Content 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Reference

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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